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INTRODUCTION 
Spend a day in a busy bankruptcy court and your research agenda could be set 
for life. Bankruptcy is crisis management for individuals, business entities, and 
even governments. The entities that file for bankruptcy come in all shapes and 
sizes, as do their troubles. In addition to basic capital structure problems, 
bankruptcy dockets and courtrooms contain allegations of sexual harassment, race 
discrimination, systemic financial risk, First Amendment issues, toxic and 
defective products (medical devices, airplanes, and automobiles), global warming 
litigation, and pyramid schemes. This catastrophist’s dream has the potential to 
provoke engagement from scholars spanning the law school curriculum.1 
That breadth of engagement, however, is missing. In a public lecture, 
commercial law scholar and teacher Jay Lawrence Westbrook lamented the lack 
of “public interest” concerns in corporate bankruptcy scholarship.2 That term 
signals something more than the aggregation of individual rights-based interests 
and arguments, to encompass the system’s broader effects—matters that cannot 
simply be waived by creditors when they settle their own claims. In addition, the 
scholarship insufficiently attends to claimants whose rights against a bankrupt 
company arise through pathways other than the fine print of a contract. 
In short, the field of corporate bankruptcy has been redistricted to wealth 
maximization, voluntary lenders, and investors.3 Academic careers have 
 
1 That is, after all, how the field of consumer bankruptcy has unfolded. The contributors to 
consumer bankruptcy debates are trained or otherwise steeped in law, sociology, economics, psychology, 
history, and political science. The consumer scholarship draws on a wider spectrum of law and 
economics than has typically been the case in corporate bankruptcy. Both empirical and theoretical, the 
scholarship explores connections between overindebtedness and domestic violence, racial and ethnic 
identity, medical problems, overconsumption, fringe credit products, overpromotion of 
homeownership, tax policy, aging, education, natural disasters, and beyond. Leading contributors are 
diverse by demographic as well as methodological and ideological measures. 
2 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Commercial Law and the Public Interest, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L 
AFF. 445, 450 (2015). 
3 This Article does not contain extended critiques of the creditors’ bargain or contractualism because 
they have been evaluated thoroughly elsewhere. Recommended analysis and critiques include Susan Block-
Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement 
of a Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 430 (1993) (concluding that model is unhelpful as applied to 
voluntary case commencement); Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 503, 508 (2001) (identifying and explaining ways in which academics’ arguments favoring simple 
contractarian bankruptcy models are “incoherent”); Susan Block-Lieb, The Politics of Privatizing Business 
Bankruptcy Law, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2000) [hereinafter Politics] (critiquing neo-libertarian bankruptcy 
theorists’ political economy analysis); Jonathan C. Lipson, Bargaining Bankrupt: A Relational Theory of Contract 
in Bankruptcy, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 239, 241 (arguing that contractarians “offer neither doctrinal nor 
theoretical accounts of the instrument and institution they laud”); id. at 242 (“Contractualism tends to rely on 
what Robert Ellickson would call a ‘cardboard’ Coasean theory of contract.”); id. at 265 (documenting how 
creditors’ bargain founder “made questionable statements of law in the service of efficiency”); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317 (1999) (critiquing view that contract 
bankruptcy is superior to the current system); Lynn M. LoPucki, Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy 
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flourished characterizing Chapter 11 as a mere corporate control transaction 
among investors, shuffling pieces of the company’s capital structure.4 Whether 
due to this framing, the lack of a popular alternative, or both, the redistricters 
tend to ignore scholarly contributions that construe the field more broadly.5 
This Article is an invitation to explore an alternative model: corporate 
bankruptcy as a public–private partnership. In this model, allocating 
responsibilities to private parties can improve regulatory functioning, but parties 
cannot redefine system goals purely for their own benefit. The application of this 
framework is supported by an institutional analysis of the bankruptcy system, 
drawing on privatization and administrative law scholarship that has received too 
little attention in bankruptcy debates.6 Scholars of the regulatory state 
understand that efficiency is not the exclusive objective: “the public law 
perspective asks not whether privatization is efficient, but whether it erodes the 
public law norms that these constitutional and statutory limits are designed to 
protect.”7 Private contributions to a system must be solicited and managed in 
ways that improve, not undermine, public regulatory objectives.8 
 
Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 747-48 (2004) (illustrating how changes over time in creditors’ bargain 
description left it “with no foundation” and “useless”). 
4 I have discussed this phenomenon in prior work. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Fast, Cheap, and Creditor-
Controlled: Is Corporate Reorganization Failing?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 401, 430 (2006) (identifying transactional 
model of Chapter 11 as “prevailing conception”); Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571 (2015) [hereinafter Chapter 11] (arguing that current views overemphasize the 
corporate law elements of Chapter 11 to the exclusion of other elements). 
5 See Lipson, supra note 3, at 261 (“While the contractualist project has been criticized for many 
reasons, no alternative vision of contract in bankruptcy has emerged.”); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 446 
(“One of the reasons that other public interest considerations have been elbowed aside is that those 
who are concerned with public interest factors do not have a church as do the public choice and 
contractualist scholars.”); see also Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: 
Whose Money Is it Anyway, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1057 (supplying a political philosophy justification 
for the government using the bankruptcy system “as an instrument of social policy” more generally, but 
expressly reserving and deferring the task of articulating the scope of such policy for another day). 
6 For (scarce) prior uses of administrative law scholarship to aid analysis of other bankruptcy 
issues, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 
875 (2015) (considering applications of nondelegation doctrine and re-delegation theory to practices 
in consumer bankruptcy); Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of 
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012) (proposing changes to reduce policymaking 
by courts in bankruptcy); Robert Kenneth Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 1567, 1568 (1991) (“seeking to integrate the administrative state into bankruptcy 
theory,” focusing on questions of forum); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking Bankruptcy 
Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1241 (2013) (comparing 
bankruptcy to other financial regulatory processes within the administrative state). 
7 Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1302 (2003). 
8 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000) (“This 
realization suggests the possibility of harnessing private capacity to serve public goals.”); id. at 551 
(“Private actors are deeply involved in regulation, service provision, policy design, and 
implementation.”); id. at 569 n.96 (emphasizing the potential of private contributions and objecting 
to assumptions that “deny the possibility of collaborative, public-oriented, accountable regulatory 
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In addition to enlivening academic debates, the public–private partnership 
model sheds new light on real-world problems. And problems abound. The 
American Bankruptcy Institute Commission on Chapter 11 recently released a 
report cataloging the ways in which Chapter 11 no longer functions in 
accordance with its original legislative mandate.9 The public–private 
partnership model not only helps diagnose shortcomings in Chapter 11 as it 
operates on the ground, but expands the range of options for addressing them. 
This Article unpacks these ideas as follows. Part I defines corporate 
bankruptcy’s public–private partnership, interrogating the common assumption 
that bankruptcy is private law, using the analytical tools of administrative law 
and privatization scholarship. Topics include the nature of liabilities addressed 
in Chapter 11, the funding of the bankruptcy system, and the standard-setting 
and oversight regime set forth in black-letter bankruptcy law. 
Part II explores features of modern Chapter 11 that distort the balance in 
the public–private partnership. The first is the most well-established: financing 
in Chapter 11 as a means of shifting control to private parties for private gain. 
The discussion then turns to features that connect to the public–private 
partnership in subtler ways, including case venue and equitable mootness 
doctrine (which combine to concentrate cases and court authority); disabling 
the threat of trustee appointment as a disciplinary backstop; and shifting major 
debtor-in-possession obligations to creditors’ committees. 
Part III offers ideas, still in germinal form, for improving the system 
inspired by the public–private partnership model. First, all repeat players 
that shape the system, including powerful private actors, must attend to 
procedural justice to maintain the system’s legitimacy. Social psychology 
research conducted in nonbankruptcy settings shows that procedural justice 
(the sense that the process was fair) is more critical to maintaining public 
confidence than economically efficient outcomes.10 A legal procedure thought 
to be efficient (by whatever measure) cannot stand if the procedure imposes 
intolerable procedural justice costs. In a public–private partnership, 
 
regimes”); see also Block-Lieb, Politics, supra note 3, at 91-92 (discussing law-and-society research on 
the recursive influence of private actors on the public sphere). 
9 AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: FINAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2014). 
10 The work of Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff canvasses this research and applies it to court and dispute 
resolution settings. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 134, 137 (2011) (“When people feel that they have received fair treatment, they are 
more likely to adhere to, accept, and feel satisfied with a given outcome, and to view the system that gave 
rise to that outcome as legitimate.”). For applications to complex litigation, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 27 (2009) (applying procedural 
justice theory to nonclass aggregate litigation); Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, & Deborah R. Hensler, 
Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 372-76 (1996) 
(exploring the role of procedural justice and representation in aggregate litigation). 
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procedural justice is not the sole responsibility of public officials. Private 
parties that dominate Chapter 11 cases also must be held accountable. 
Second, I propose the Sunlight Fund, a not-for-profit enterprise. To 
moderate the leverage of private lenders, the Sunlight Fund could be tapped 
to finance portions of Chapter 11 cases with the potential to enhance the 
bankruptcy estate, or achieve other public objectives. 
Returning to the academic realm, Part III lastly calls for a reckoning with 
the field’s homogeneity—in ideology (traditional law and economics),11 and 
demography (white and male).12 Making readers more attentive to whom they 
cite and invite could reset the boundaries of not only who counts as a “leading 
scholar,” but of the field itself, allowing the kind of engagement with a broader 
set of problems and methods that Jay Westbrook has endorsed. 
I. PRIVATE ACTORS, PUBLIC GOALS: THE PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP 
A. What Is It? 
Governments and private parties collaborate on public projects in 
seemingly infinite patterns.13 The nature and intensity of private involvement 
in any regulatory enterprise can vary. The public–private partnership is one 
 
11 Law and economics is, or could be, a large umbrella but the scholarship on corporate 
bankruptcy generally reflects just a subset. Cf. Jean Braucher, Toward a Broader Perspective on the Role 
of Economics in Legal Policy Analysis: A Retrospective and an Agenda from Albert O. Hirschman, 13 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 741, 745-46 (1988) (identifying Hirschman’s appreciation for cooperation and moral 
obligation in a successful market economy and the need to consider the broader social context); Jean 
Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 512-14 (1994) 
(explaining the broader possibilities of bankruptcy reorganization for economic development); 
Martha T. McCluskey, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Taub, Law and Economics: Contemporary 
Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300 (2016) (discussing the “current cramped confines” of 
the dominant strand of law and economics). 
12 As discussed later, the challenge of demographic homogeneity in this field transcends scholarly 
methods or ideology. See infra Part III. 
13 See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (2003) 
(discussing public–private collaborations in modern administrative state); Martha Minow, Public 
and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (2003) 
(explaining the intersecting trends in privatization involving public government actors); see also Jody 
Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 
816 (2000) (discussing the role of non-government actors in standard setting, implementation, and 
enforcement); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 518 
(2016)(“[P]rivatization typically involves enlisting private actors to perform, on the government’s 
behalf, functions that otherwise would be carried out by government employees.”); id. at 522 
(discussing hybridity across variety of arrangements). Examples include industrial codes and 
product settings, and arise even in traditional command-and-control frameworks. Freeman, supra 
note 13, at 827, 835-36. 
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way of expressing such collaborations. An early publication using the term 
defines the concept this way: 
a legal hybrid which possesses some characteristics of a purely private 
corporation and others of a purely governmental corporation. It may be 
owned jointly by government and private interests or owned privately and 
financed jointly with public and private funds. But however it is structured, 
it is formed to accomplish a public purpose.14 
This framework recognizes that private actors may offer expertise, 
efficiency, and innovation.15 But there is an important catch: the partnership is 
meant to promote public values. Achieving those objectives requires planning, 
not merely a handover of the keys to willing profit seekers.16 Private provision 
of public goods, without sufficient safeguards, risks end runs around 
constitutional obligations of state actors.17 Erosion of the public foundation 
imposes stress on democracy, accountability, and general welfare.18 Gillian 
Metzger notes that “[t]he concerns raised by privatization are not merely free-
floating normative or policy concerns; they emanate from the basic 
constitutional accountability premise that government is subject to certain 
constraints in the way it operates.”19 Delegations to private actors must be 
“adequately structured to preserve constitutional accountability.”20 Left to their 
own devices, private actors may underinvest in socially useful activities and 
overinvest in activities with little or no social utility.21 When governments use 
market mechanisms, they can and should advance public values.22 
 
14 Robert S. Amdursky, A Public–Private Partnership for Urban Progress, 46 J. URB. L. 199, 199 (1969). 
15 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 846 (explaining that the “private role in regulation is even 
more pervasive and longstanding than the literature suggests,” even in command-and-control 
settings); Minow, supra note 13, at 1230, 1240-42, 1245 (describing market-style competition and 
innovation among justifications to move public functions into private hands). 
16 See Freeman, supra note 7, at 1327 (explaining the focus on enlisting private sector entities 
to protect democratic norms). 
17 See, e.g., Minow, supra note 13, at 1246 (“Government agencies act not only as purchasers of 
goods and services but also as guarantors of freedom and equality.”); id. at 1246 n.60 (“Due process, 
equal protection, freedom of information, and public participation are leading public values 
jeopardized by privatization of public services.”); id. at 1267 (encouraging transparency to promote 
accountability of private providers of public goods). 
18 See Audrey G. McFarlane, Putting the “Public” Back into Public–Private Partnerships for 
Economic Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 45-46 (2007) (discussing how partnerships have 
become increasingly private). 
19 Metzger, supra note 13, at 1456. 
20 See Id.; Freeman, supra note 7, at 1301 (expressing concern about privatization’s impact on 
“liberal democratic norms of accountability, due process, equality, rationality, and the like”); Minow, 
supra note 13, at 1259 (discussing accountability as the key element to delegating public functions). 
21 Lemos, supra note 13, at 525-26. 
22 MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
(2002). Minow gives the example of the government auctioning off the electromagnetic spectrum: “To 
think in public terms would require viewing the sale of the public asset as a resource with the potential 
2018] Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity 1721 
Defining “the public interest” can be a contested exercise. Recognizing 
that the public interest is unlikely to be boiled down to just one thing is an 
important step. Martha Minow’s work on privatization offers an illustrative 
list of public goals and values key to collaborations of many kinds: 
 
- Achieving social provision—human needs, redressing inequality; 
- Freedom of self-expression and political practice; 
- Pluralism—cultivate “participation, self-governance, mutual aid, and 
care for others”; 
- Democracy; 
- Division of labor; and 
- Accountability.23 
 
The last point, accountability, is particularly critical, says Minow, to assess 
fulfillment of other values.24 As the list suggests, the values need not be 
specific and exclusive to the substantive focus of the partnership and need not 
be winnowed to a single overriding purpose. We should speak of public values 
instead of “the public interest” as a monolith.25 
B. Utility for Corporate Bankruptcy 
Corporate bankruptcy’s frequent characterization as private law, rather than 
public law or a hybrid, is curious and overdue for interrogation. Limited liability 
and other features associated with a corporate charter are forms of government 
largess, state-conferred public benefits.26 Business restructuring and failure affect 
more than the coffers of voluntary investors; they impair the rights of individuals 
who made no conscious choice to dabble in distressed debt and yet may not be 
 
for enhancing a public good—but only if the proceeds from the auctions are preserved for distinctive 
purposes” rather than simply handing the money over to the Treasury to pay the deficit. Id. at 19. 
23 Id. at 45-46 (explaining that “prevent[ing] abuse, fraud, and waste, and . . . enhanc[ing] 
learning and improvement, transparent and effective means of accountability, in the day-to-day 
administrative settings as well as through formal public elections” should be a key goal of public–
private partnerships). 
24 Id. at 150-51. 
25 Id. 
26 See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1462 (classifying “[l]icenses, corporate charters, and rights of 
property and contract . . . [as] ‘delegations’ of state power to private actors”); Hillary A. Sale, Public 
Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (2013) (stating that corporations are public in the 
sense that they are “entities that exist with the permission of the government”). 
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able to absorb the loss without further consequence.27 Business restructuring and 
failure produce ripple effects in communities and society at large.28 
Contractualist scholars do not deny the presence of involuntary creditors but 
marginalize their significance to corporate bankruptcy theory. Proposals to repeal 
Chapter 11 in favor of full private ordering often concede that involuntary 
creditors might warrant special treatment.29 Yet, National Involuntary Creditor 
Reflection Day has yet to arrive. When scholars raised questions of the broader 
public interest in bankruptcy several decades ago, critiques on institutional 
competence grounds quickly emerged, expressing doubt that judges in an 
adversarial system could identify the public interest.30 And that was that. 
Stepping back from the particulars of this field, it is far from clear that law 
should attribute much significance to the highly contested labels “private” and 
“public.”31 Ascribing law to one or the other of these realms is a function of 
 
27 See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An Empirical 
Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1211, 1225, 1237 (2005) (identifying potentially involuntary and non-
adjusting creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy); id. at 1238 (“In 1994, more than one in every four dollars of claims 
listed in bankruptcy was owed to a maladjusting creditor . . . . Based on the 2002 projection, about one-fifth of 
the dollar amount of claims in bankruptcy is held by creditors that could be classified as maladjusting.”). 
28 See Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1031, 1034-35 (1994)(describing the community-wide negative impact of the bankruptcy of a contractor on 
Asbury Park, New Jersey); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 457 (noting that factors like “community stability” are 
typically not considered in bankruptcy law, and distinguishing between aggregation of claims and “significant 
secondary effects of commercial law rules”); Mary Jo Wiggins, Finance and Factionalism: The Uneasy Present (and 
Future) of Special Interest Committees in Corporate Reorganization Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1373, 1374, 1383 
(2004) (“Corporate bankruptcy cases have wide social, economic, and political reach . . . . Issues of voice, 
representation, legitimacy, and transparency become key policies that must be considered . . . .”); see also Hillary 
A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 138, 144-46 (2011) (discussing the social effects 
of seemingly private corporate decisionmaking, such as setting executive compensation). 
29 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 
11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 714 n.165 (2018) (discussing examples). 
30 See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the Judicial 
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 77 (1995) (contending that “the bankruptcy process is institutionally 
incapable of resolving the loss distribution issues among all who are interested in the outcome of 
the case . . . the judicial system is particularly ill-equipped . . .”). 
31 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 8, at 550 (discussing the “linguistic conundrum” of “public” and 
“private” and the importance of these terms as signifiers—they are associated with “different 
capacities, cultures, and priorities, for example, and respond to different incentives”); id. at 551 
(discussing “[y]ou know it when you see it” definitions of public and private); Freeman, supra note 
20, at 1287 (arguing that private refers to a host of arrangements rather than a single thing); Metzger, 
supra note 13, at 1443 (arguing that “every instance of economic and social legislation could be seen 
as a private delegation of power” and noting that “Legal Realists . . . [made] the claim that it was 
impossible to draw a neutral or objective line between public and private for constitutional 
purposes”); Minow, supra note 13, at 1229 n.1 (discussing the difficulty of making meaning of these 
terms and their interconnections); see also Lemos, supra note 13, at 519 (“Understanding these 
questions, not as discrete policy dilemmas but as part of the broader privatization phenomenon, 
helps clarify the interests at stake and suggests useful avenues for normative assessment.”); Julie A. 
Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 993, 998 (1996) (categorizing 
features of “new private law” and “new public law”). 
2018] Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity 1723 
historical context and social construct; private parties once dominated exercises 
of power now identified as governmental.32 The public–private dichotomy also 
risks circularity: just as the nature of an activity affects the label, the label 
affects perceptions of its nature. The distinction persists, however, in 
scholarship, in the law school curriculum, and in appellate court decisions, 
particularly on state action doctrine.33 Refusing to use the terms would not save 
bankruptcy law from their consequences.34 But we should use them more 
constructively—focusing, as Jody Freeman recommends, on the negotiated 
relationships between public and private actors.35 
In any event, it is a mistake to conflate involvement of private actors and 
contractual liabilities with the nature of bankruptcy law. Even a minimalist 
government-provided system—the automatic stay, a permanent injunction on 
debt enforcement without unanimous consent—involves coercive government 
power.36 At the very least, the public has a stake in who makes the key decisions 
in corporate bankruptcy and whether that process comports with basic 
constitutional and democratic norms. The interests of the public grow alongside 
the scope of a government-supplied bankruptcy system. Constitutional and 
quasi-constitutional matters cannot be kicked to the curb simply because a 
company experiences financial distress and initiates a Chapter 11 case. 
Congress’s exercise of its constitutional authority to create uniform 
bankruptcy laws thus triggers the need for accountability and due process 
safeguards. This is the case whether or not responsibilities are undertaken by 
public officials or outsourced to private parties.37 
C. Contracts and Other Liabilities 
Chapter 11’s identity crisis arises in part from the integral role of contracts in 
the establishment of debt. Even scholars who have opposed limiting bankruptcy’s 
 
32 See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 13, at 524, 572 (noting examples of shift from private to public 
authority, and vice versa). 
33 For discussion of the continued doctrinal role of the private and public distinction in constitutional 
and administrative law, see Freeman, supra note 13, at 841; Metzger, supra note 13 at 1370, 1448. 
34 Because the analysis in this Article largely is independent of the bankruptcy court’s non-
Article III status, I do not rely on the “public rights” question regarding the constitutional authority 
of non-Article III tribunals, an issue recently addressed in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Group, LLC,138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
35 Freeman, supra note 8, at 548, 565; see also Freeman, supra note 13, at 857 (suggesting a focus 
on the “regulatory regimes in which agencies are in dynamic relationships with private actors” rather 
than distinguishing between private and public law). 
36 As an example of a minimalist bankruptcy, consider the proposal to add Chapter 16 to the 
Bankruptcy Code. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, PROPOSAL FOR A NEW CHAPTER 
FOR RESTRUCTURING BOND AND CREDIT AGREEMENT DEBT (CHAPTER 16) 1 (2014) (creating 
stripped-down bankruptcy to bind holdouts in bond indentures). 
37 See Freeman, supra note 15, at 824 (“Concern about accountability and legality . . . arise with 
almost every example of contracting out”). 
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role to creditor wealth maximization, such as now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, 
frequently have highlighted the system’s contractual elements.38 Separate from 
calls for consideration of the public interest, Jay Westbrook has written 
foundational works on the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy.39 
These scholars, however, also have documented the pervasiveness of 
involuntary and non-adjusting creditors.40 As Kate Heidt wrote before her 
untimely death, liabilities such as those arising from environmental harm 
sometimes rise to the level of worldwide politics and public health concerns.41 
Bankruptcy cases involve debts arising from police brutality,42 employment 
discrimination,43 and, as exemplified in The Weinstein Company bankruptcy, 
sexual harassment and assault.44 
 
38 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 368-
69 (1993) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Policymaking] (discussing how Chapter 11 is privately initiated and 
monitored with the state providing only a forum and procedures); id. at 364-65 (bankruptcy reduces 
pressure on Congress to fund bailouts, indicating that government participation in bankruptcy is 
“largely” or “partially” self-supported by the parties, not publicly funded); Elizabeth Warren, What 
is a Women’s Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 53 (2002) (“The perception of bankruptcy as a ‘government program’ is flatly 
wrong. Bankruptcy is about commercial debt and the allocation of losses among parties who enter 
into contracts voluntarily.”); id. at 55 (“[B]ankruptcy is the privately funded part of the social safety 
net. No debtor gets a handout or a government guaranteed loan from the bankruptcy court . . . .[A] 
large portion of the services . . . are paid for by user fees.”); Elizabeth Warren, “Why Have a Federal 
Bankruptcy System?”, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1992) (“Is the bankruptcy system socialization 
of risk? No. My sense is that the reason bank failures and bankruptcy are stitched together in this 
panel is that the bankruptcy system is what happens when we do not socialize the risk, and bank 
failure is what happens when we do.”). 
39 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989). 
40 Warren & Westbrook, supra note 27; Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm of Debt, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1055, 1058 (1994) (“[T]he traditional concept of debt has been expanded to include 
not only consensual obligations but also obligations that arise from nonconsensual transactions.”). 
41 Heidt, supra note 40, at 1062 n.28 (“Some believe that environmental matters affect world 
political stability . . . contributing to violent conflicts in parts of the world and hav[ing] the potential 
to contribute to conflict and social instability in the future in poorer nations.”); Kathryn R. Heidt, 
Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot?, 
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 359 (1990) (using toxic waste as an example of initial harm having 
an impact for decades, if not centuries). 
42 Melissa B. Jacoby & Mary Ellen Goode, Who Pays for Police Misconduct in Bankrupt Cities? 
(Sept. 20, 2016)(U.N.C. L. Stud., Research Paper No. 2796582). 
43 See Joanne Gelfand, The Treatment of Employment Discrimination Claims in Bankruptcy: Priority 
Status, Stay Relief, Dischargeability and Exemptions, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 601, 601 (2002) (“Low dollar 
distributions on discrimination claims eviscerates the rehabilitative and deterrent goals of [civil 
rights laws].”). 
44 See Libby Lewis, How Bankruptcy Law Could Keep Money—and the Truth—from Weinstein’s 
Victims, WASH. POST, May 2, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/how-bankruptcy-law-
could-keep-money—and-the-truth—from-weinsteins-victims/2018/05/02/88f29b12-4e3f-11e8-84a0-
458a1aa9ac0a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8f0bdcf88ea0 [https://perma.cc/7E62-NAJG]. 
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These liabilities make it hard to characterize bankruptcy as simply a species of 
private law.45 Civil rights claims are quasi-constitutional at the very least.46 If it is 
true that “Americans now believe that a core function of the federal government 
is to prohibit discrimination in the public and private sectors,”47 then federal court 
cases should reflect those concerns even in the context of bankruptcy. 
Even with respect to consensual contractual obligation, no liability that 
depends on formal legal enforcement can be truly private. Contract and 
property rights are creatures of the state, with teeth sharpened by the threat 
or reality of government assistance with debt collection.48 A court 
adjudicating contract law must be, and will be, evaluated as a public 
institution and measured against norms of legitimacy and accountability.49 
Debtor-creditor law relies on coercive power of government actors to an even 
greater extent than mere adjudication of liability. For example, state law 
permits private parties to direct sheriffs to levy on a debtor’s property after a 
court awards a judgment, diverting time and resources from other law 
enforcement tasks.50 Settlements of disputes over liability present elements 
of private transacting but harness public power when they are promoted by 
courts, or if the law requires court approval due to third-party consequences.51 
 
45 Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 1567 (“Although bankruptcy law is generally conceived to be a 
private law regime, the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not remove a debtor from the reach of 
public law . . . .”); id. at 1578 (“The creditors’ bargain model fails to recognize any meaningful 
difference between a private party pursuing a dispute against the debtor and the government doing 
so.”). See generally Freeman, supra note 7, at 1303 (describing characteristics of public law perspective 
to include accountability, due process, and rationality, as well as “a preference for deliberative, 
disinterested, and expert decisionmaking that does not merely serve the interests of a special few.”). 
46 See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1455, n.307 (“[C]ore federal antidiscrimination statutes such as 
Title VII have been described as ‘quasi-constitutional.’”). 
47 Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 502 (2000). 
48 See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 
1240 (1996) (“The importance of this deconstruction of the public/private dichotomy is to 
demonstrate that government regulates even when it claims not to”); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and 
the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 11 (1992) (distinguishing between critiques of 
public–private distinction and examining indeterminacy arguments); Minow, supra note 13, at 1267 
(“[C]ontract law is no less dependent upon public enforcement”); Nice, supra note 31, at 993-94 
(discussing overlap of what has been traditionally characterized as private and public law). 
49 See Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as Economic and Social Rights, in 
THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 2 (Katharine G. Young, ed., forthcoming 2018) 
(distinguishing between courts as a place where social and economic rights are considered and enforced 
and “courts themselves as services that governments must provide to individuals”); id. at 3 (“[S]eeing courts 
as economic and social rights clarifies the utility of government services committed to norms of fairness.”). 
50 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J. L., MED. 
& ETHICS 560, 565-66 (2002) (describing the government’s role in enforcing private debt 
obligations); see also Mann, supra note 5, at 1053-56 (discussing the redistributive nature of the 
government system of dealing with bankruptcy). 
51 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
55, 67 (2016) [hereinafter Federalism] (“With varying levels of enthusiasm, scholars have documented 
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In summary, based on liabilities, even a minimalist form of bankruptcy is 
best understood as a hybrid form of law. This hybridity increases the salience 
of the public–private partnership model. 
D. Follow the Money 
 Sources of funding shape the extent to which a system or function is seen 
as privatized.52 Particularly through filing fees, private parties in bankruptcy 
cases fund not only significant portions (an estimated three quarters) of the 
bankruptcy system but other government functions as well.53 Much of the 
money comes from fees for initiating bankruptcy cases.54 Fees associated with 
filing particular motions or adversary proceedings within a case contribute a 
smaller, but nontrivial, amount.55 The bankruptcy system also generates 
private fees when parties or members of the public pay to access electronic 
court records.56 Chapter 11 cases require quarterly fees, calibrated to 
disbursements, payable to an administrative watchdog within the U.S. 
Department of Justice known as the U.S. Trustee.57 Between 2010 and 2014, 
quarterly fees generated about $138 million per year.58 In 2017, Congress not 
only increased the amount owed for cases with greater disbursements, but 
directed a portion of the resulting revenues to the Treasury.59 
 
courts’ heavy use of informal and non-adversarial techniques to expedite proceedings, discourage litigation, 
direct fact-gathering, and encourage settlement.”); Jacoby, Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 585 (“[B]ankruptcy 
courts are neither unique in straddling the worlds of deals and litigation, nor alone in being foisted into 
the delicate position of policing a negotiated outcome under conflicting expectations.”). 
52 See Lemos, supra note 13, at 518 (describing reliance on user fees as form of privatization); 
id. at 523 (providing examples of reliance on private payments). 
53 See Ed Flynn, Is Bankruptcy the Red-Headed Stepchild of the Judiciary?, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., OCT. 2015, at 36, 58 [hereinafter Stepchild] (estimating the total annual administrative costs of 
bankruptcy (not limited to the courts) to be over $1.5 billion, and reporting that “nearly one quarter 
of filing fees are paid to the Treasury); id. at 59 (stating that over $100 million a year “are diverted 
into a general government fund”); Ed Flynn, Chapter 13 Revisited: Can it Help Solve the Judiciary’s 
Fiscal Problems?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2013, at 11, 73 (proposing a one-percent surcharge on 
Chapter 13 disbursements to be allocated to federal judiciary). 
54 Case filing fees provided about $375 million annually between 2010 and 2014. The fee for filing a 
non-railroad Chapter 11 petition is currently $1717. Flynn, Stepchild, supra note 53, at 58. The U.S. Supreme 
Court cited the need for those fees to run the system when it declined to recognize a constitutional right 
to access bankruptcy in the absence of the ability to pay. U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973). 
55 Flynn, Stepchild, supra note 53, at 58 (noting that fees for filing motions for relief from the 
automatic stay and adversary proceedings raised at least another $50 million per year). 
56 Id. (describing how fees from accessing bankruptcy court records generate at least $60 million a 
year). As with other sources, these revenues are not necessarily funneled back into the bankruptcy system. 
57 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) (2012); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CHAPTER 11 QUARTERLY FEES 
(2014). On the low end, cases with quarterly disbursements between $0 and $14,999.99 owe a $325 
quarterly fee. On the high end, cases with $30,000,000 or more owe a $30,000 quarterly fee. 
58 Flynn, Stepchild, supra note 53, at 58. 
59 Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, H.R. 2266, 115th Cong. § 1004 (2017) (explaining that for 
fiscal years 2018-2022, “if the balance in the United States Trustee System Fund as of September 30 
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Private parties also keep businesses financially afloat during their stay in 
the bankruptcy system.60 The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code anticipated 
the possibility that distressed businesses would need third parties to fill the 
liquidity gap, and the Bankruptcy Code accordingly incentivizes lenders to 
offer debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing.61 As Part II will explore, 
however, the drafters may not have anticipated the extent to which 
prebankruptcy lenders would be permitted to use DIP financing to cherry-
pick the activities and litigation the bankruptcy estate could undertake. 
In summary, the bankruptcy system relies heavily on private sources of funds 
rather than drawing exclusively or even dominantly from the Treasury. In 
retrospect, it should not be surprising that this funding structure tempts private 
parties to try to operate the system purely in self-interest. But, given the structure 
of public oversight and standard-setting discussed below, drafters may have 
expected more tempering of those private incentives than we see today. 
E. Oversight and Standard-Setting 
In creating the bankruptcy system, policymakers engaged in considerable and 
deliberate balancing between public control and private outsourcing. As written, 
the Bankruptcy and Judicial Codes invite ongoing involvement of private actors 
in pursuit of the system’s public functions. Yet, textbook bankruptcy law 
implicitly and explicitly anticipates that public actors plus substantive standards 
in the Bankruptcy Code will cabin private party influence. This approach is 
consistent with the need for checks and balances in any public–private 
partnership to ensure maintenance and promotion of public values. 
For the most part, private actors formally initiate bankruptcy filings.62 
Reliance on private initiation is not free from problems, but proposed 
responses tend to tweak the incentives rather than reallocate the 
responsibility to a public official.63 Also, the Judicial Code expressly allocates 
 
. . . is less than $200,000,000, the quarterly fee payable for a quarter in which disbursements equal 
or exceed $1,000,000 shall be the lesser of 1 percent of such disbursements or $250,000”). 
60 Third parties cannot be required to lend new money on a prebankruptcy agreement once a 
bankruptcy case is commenced. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2012). 
61 Id. § 364. 
62 Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy filings present an exception and require state approval and 
voluntary action by whoever has authority to make decisions for the municipality. Jacoby, Federalism, 
supra note 51, at 61-64. 
63 See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Privatizing Ethics in Corporate Reorganizations, 93 MINN. 
L. REV. 875 (2009); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 38, at 368-69 (discussing 
preference for private over public initiation). 
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to private parties the ability to select the case’s venue.64 Both initiation and 
venue are coupled with the possibility of public official review.65 
The two key public officials in corporate bankruptcy cases are the court 
and the administrative watchdog.66 In addition to specific grants of oversight, 
the Bankruptcy Code gives courts many pockets of discretionary authority 
and the right to raise issues sua sponte.67 Use of this authority is complicated 
by not only the non-Article III status of bankruptcy judges, but the shared 
sense that rules and standards in the Bankruptcy Code are calibrated to 
promote bargaining, negotiation, and settlement.68 Thus, while some judges 
read the law as imposing a duty to independently evaluate the elements of 
plan confirmation even in the absence of objections,69 others are reluctant to 
intervene when parties profess harmony with one another.70 In between case 
initiation and plan confirmation in a traditional Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy 
Code anticipates ongoing court oversight for matters such as hiring and 
paying professionals, incurring new debt, rejecting or assuming contracts, and 
selling assets outside the ordinary course of business. 
The administrative watchdog,71 which has its own list of oversight 
responsibilities, was created in response to concerns about a “Bankruptcy 
Ring.”72 The watchdog can participate directly in all types of bankruptcy 
 
64 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). For more discussion, see infra Section II.B.1. 
65 A court may dismiss a Chapter 11 case if it was not filed in good faith. See, e.g., In re SGL 
Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999). And a court may transfer a case to another venue in the 
interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties. See, e.g., In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 
718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2012) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1412). 
66 See infra note 71. Another government entity, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission had 
a significant role in the earlier corporate bankruptcy system, but its role was dramatically reduced in 1978. 
See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 19 (2001). 
67 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
68 See Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1694 (1996) 
(“[F]ormal rules of plan confirmation, then, create a bargaining regime in which leverage is 
distributed among the parties in such a way that each and all may influence the terms of 
reorganization.”); see also Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price 
of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 884 (2014). 
69 See Jacoby, Federalism, supra note 51, at 77 (describing inquisitorial techniques and 
expectations); Jacoby, supra note 6, at 883 (discussing the Everett v. Perez and Alabama Department of 
Economic and Community Affairs v. Lett (In re Lett) decisions, in which appellate courts heard issues 
on appeal that were not argued in the lower courts). 
70 See Jacoby, Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 583 n.82 (giving examples). 
71 In addition to the Executive Office of U.S. Trustees in Washington, D.C., Congress 
established twenty-one regions and regional offices that cover everywhere but districts in Alabama 
and North Carolina. See 28 U.S.C. § 581 (2012)(delineating the regions). In districts in Alabama and 
North Carolina, U.S. Trustee responsibilities are performed instead by the Office of the Bankruptcy 
Administrator, which is part of the federal judiciary. The legislation and rulemaking to implement 
this alternative system are documented in Pardo & Watts, supra note 6, at 396-97. 
72 See SKEEL, supra note 66, at 76-77, 133, 146; Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of 
Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 
296-97 (1995); see also Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 395 
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cases, including Chapter 11.73 It can weigh in on substantive and logistical 
matters including compensation of Chapter 11 professionals.74 Also within its 
portfolio are the appointment and supervision of a variety of private 
individuals and entities, both nonprofit and for-profit, to perform statutorily 
required roles. These roles include case trustee, providers of credit counseling 
briefings and debtor education in individual debtor cases, consumer privacy 
ombudsperson, health care ombudsperson, and examiner.75 
The power to select a Chapter 11 trustee is particularly consequential. 
Unlike in Chapters 7, 12, and 13, trustee appointment in Chapter 11 is not 
automatic and is meant to be an exception rather than the rule. But structural 
discipline flows from the possibility that the court will authorize trustee 
appointment and the administrative watchdog will select the person to fill that 
role.76 The resulting structural discipline could affect not only the debtor 
company but other parties with strong economic or legal leverage, such as 
lenders with security interests in key assets of the debtor. 
F. Implications 
By statutory design, the U.S. business bankruptcy system can be 
conceptualized as a public–private partnership. In addition to handling claims 
arising from a variety of legal theories, the bankruptcy system depends on a 
mixture of private and public funds to operate. Whatever running room the 
Bankruptcy Code gives private parties to craft resolutions is balanced against 
 
(2015) (comparing historic concerns about a bankruptcy ring to perceptions of elite Chapter 11 
professionals). As I have written elsewhere, “bankruptcy referees were appointees of friendly district 
court judges, and appointers of case trustees who also were parties in litigation,” producing concerns 
about patronage that cast a shadow on the system. Jacoby, Chapter 11, supra note 4, at 577. This concern 
is not unique to bankruptcy, of course. See generally Lemos, supra note 13, at 543 (“The federal 
government and some states have instituted reforms designed to combat cronyism in the award of 
government litigation work.”). 
73 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A)–(I), (5), (7)–(8) (2012). 
74 Id. § 586(a)(3)(A). 
75 See 11 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2012) (setting forth parameters for approving the use of nonprofit budget 
and credit counseling providers or instructional courses on personal financial management); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 586(a)(1), (2), (b), (d) (2012); (delineating responsibilities of each U.S. Trustee and the extent to 
which a U.S. Trustee can establish requirements for panel trustee service); id. § 586(f) (authorizing 
hiring of auditors); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333 (2012) (describing the procedure for U.S. Trustee 
appointment of a patient care ombudsperson or a consumer privacy ombudsperson); id. § 1104 
(providing the substantive grounds and procedure for appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or examiner). 
76 Although creditors can elect a trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b), enacted in 1994, few published 
cases discuss the process, which seems to be rarely invoked. See, e.g., In re Petters Co., 425 B.R. 534, 540 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2010); In re Nat’l Farm Fin. Corp., No. 07-31580, 2008 WL 410236, at *6 n.8 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2008); In re Aspen Marine Grp, 189 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). See generally 
AM. BANKR. INST., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 29-30 (2014) (discussing trustee election option and calling it “unsatisfactory”). 
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a double-branch dose of public official oversight and substantive standards 
meant to condition use of Chapter 11’s extraordinary legal tools. 
II. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS THAT SKEW THE PARTNERSHIP 
As previously discussed, a hybrid system that privatizes some public functions 
requires safeguards to protect constitutional and democratic norms, as well as 
particular objectives of that system.77 This is as true for bankruptcy as elsewhere. 
In the bankruptcy system, however, institutional actors have moved the 
“baselines” incrementally, one motion and court order at a time.78 Whereas 
Part I showed how the textbook version of the American bankruptcy system 
draws on a combination of public and private actors to advance public 
interests, features of modern Chapter 11 distort the public–private balance 
and delink extraordinary legal tools from public standards and oversight. The 
example in subpart A, below, is fairly well recognized. But the public–private 
partnership has become dysfunctional in other, quieter, ways, as detailed in 
subsequent linked examples. 
A. Control by Lending Agreement 
In modern Chapter 11 cases, parties often argue that the ordinary rules of 
Chapter 11 are unaffordable due to urgency, whether real or manufactured. 
This framing facilitates DIP financing (often bridges to quick all-asset sales) 
with terms considered “odious” even by restructuring professionals.79 
However high the cost of these loans, a perhaps bigger concern is how 
 
77 See Freeman, supra note 8, at 589. 
78 For research on how legal institutions can be remade without statutory amendment, see Melissa 
B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 221 (2004) (presenting examples of changes to the bankruptcy system while the statute remained 
static, and identifying alternative non-statutory channels of reform); see also Lipson, supra note 3, at 266 
(2016) (noting that although contractualist proposals did not get enacted in legislation, “it seems more 
than mere coincidence that Chapter 11 has become an increasingly contractualized process”). 
79 Marc J. Heimowitz, Government as Rescue Financier: Not Just a Private Lender, 19 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 49, 51 (2016) (“Restructuring professionals understand and generally accept the proposition 
that when there is no better alternative even odious private rescue financing should be accepted on 
proffered terms.”). Academics agree. See, e.g., Adrian J. Walters, Statutory Erosion of Secured Creditors’ 
Rights: Some Insights from the United Kingdom, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 545 (“[A]ccording to the 
prevailing conventional wisdom, Chapter 11, in the general run of cases, has become little more than 
a glorified nationwide foreclosure process through which secured creditors can exit via a quick 
section 363 sale or an outright liquidation.”); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Secured 
Party in Possession, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 12 (2003) (“American lawyers are now creating the 
SPIP (secured-party-in-possession).”). See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The (Il)legitimacy of 
Bankruptcies for the Benefit of Secured Creditors, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 735, 764 (forum shopping into 
bankruptcy for secured creditors’ benefit has the capacity for “mischief”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 795, 860-61 (2004) (identifying control as the 
central concept in models of dominant secured lending and the distributional impact of this control). 
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prepetition lenders use DIP lending to direct the activities of the bankruptcy 
estate. For example, lenders abhor funding lawsuits against themselves.80 
Thus, lenders use the promise of DIP financing to prevent being sued, or to 
deter other steps that might promote public values. With heightened 
knowledge of the debtor’s financial condition, the DIP lender is in a unique 
position to run out the clock. 
To be sure, one can find examples of courts pushing back and refusing to 
sign overreaching proposed orders.81 Seemingly more often than not, though, 
courts sign orders supported by key parties and a string of citations showing 
that whatever it is has been done before, haunted by the worry that resistance 
will reduce creditor returns.82 Such rulings implicitly subordinate other 
public objectives to (mostly voluntary) creditor wealth maximization. 
B. Court Concentration, Squared 
A second mechanism destabilizing bankruptcy’s public–private partnership 
involves the reduction of the number and types of courts overseeing larger Chapter 
11 cases. The two components of this concentration are addressed separately. 
1. The Initial Forum 
Larger Chapter 11 cases are concentrated in a handful of judicial districts. 
The governing statute is partially responsible. Bankruptcy venue law allocates 
forum selection to the private party that initiates the bankruptcy case. 
Departing from other federal venue laws, the statute provides several options 
based on geographic connections of the debtor rather than creditors or other 
stakeholders.83 Bankruptcy’s affiliate venue rule gives even more latitude, 
 
80 See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 137 S. Ct. 973, 983 (2017) (“Sun insisted upon a settlement 
that gave petitioners nothing only because it did not want to help fund petitioners’ WARN lawsuit against it.”). 
81 See, e.g., In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, 510 B.R. 55, 61 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014) (capping a lender’s 
credit bid in light of evidence of misbehavior); Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Bankruptcy Sales, in 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY HANDBOOK (Barry Adler ed., forthcoming 2019) (discussing Fisker case). 
82 See Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee, Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 83 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 663, 690 (2009) (“So very much of Chapter 11 practice . . . has become bankruptcy court 
ratification of whatever deal is worked out among secured lenders, the debtor and the unsecured 
creditors’ committee in the context of settlements, sales, and financings, that those deals pretermit 
or predetermine the terms of any reorganization plan.”); Jacoby & Janger, supra note 68, at 889. For 
example, the committee’s lawyer in Jevic said, “This is hardly the first case where such an 
arrangement has been approved by the Court. It’s not the first case where this Court has approved 
such an arrangement, and it’s not the first case this month where this Court has approved an 
arrangement of this kind.” Transcript of Hearing at 101, In re Jevic Holding Corp., 526 B.R. 547, (D. 
Del. Nov. 13, 2012) (No. 75); id. at 109 (“Court has approved in another context a gifting or class 
gifting arrangement where some priority creditors benefited and other that this [sic.] priority 
creditors did not. So we don’t think that this is, again, breaking new ground.”). 
83 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2012). 
1732 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1715 
allowing a corporate parent debtor to file a Chapter 11 petition in a forum 
based only on the contacts of a tiny subsidiary.84 The statutory foundation 
notwithstanding, the drafters likely did not anticipate the level of 
concentration that developed.85 
Venue patterns present several challenges for the public–private 
partnership. First, the unevenly distributed volume of large corporate cases 
severely taxes busy courts’ institutional capacity to exercise the oversight that 
both appellate courts and the Bankruptcy Code expect.86 With the volume of 
documents filed in a typical large Chapter 11 and the expedited timeframe 
that certain lenders favor, it can be literally impossible for courts to gain the 
familiarity necessary to fulfill public–private partnership obligations. The 
court and administrative watchdog instead engage in ongoing triage. That 
time crunch and need for triage may be among the elements lenders and 
others consider when seeking to influence a debtor’s venue selection.87 
Second, recall that bankruptcy’s public purposes need not be unique to 
the subject matter; they include constitutional and democratic values. Based 
on the non-bankruptcy law of venue and personal jurisdiction, corporate 
bankruptcy venue law seems out of step. Personal jurisdiction doctrine 
outside of bankruptcy prevents a parent company from being sued in a 
jurisdiction selected only because it has a subsidiary “at home” there.88 Recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions emphasize the burden on parties involuntarily 
brought to court.89 Filers of civil actions cannot choose a venue based solely 
 
84 Id. 
85 See Coordes, supra note 72, at 390, 399 (looking at history, comparing to tax and international 
trade courts, and arguing that Congress intended to decentralize the bankruptcy system). Lynn 
LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research Database has the most comprehensive venue information for large 
publicly held companies. UCLA–LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, UCLA SCH. L., 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu [https://perma.cc/YU9B-PH33]. 
86 Coordes, supra note 72, at 404 (“Instead of depending on the experience of judges sitting in only 
two courts with crowded dockets, a national array of experienced judges would provide more efficient and 
effective resolutions to a larger number of bankruptcy cases.”); Jacoby, Chapter 11, supra note 4; Jacoby, supra 
note 6 (discussing expectations of bankruptcy courts held by the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeal); 
see also infra note 116 (citing appellate courts calling for bankruptcy court oversight of derivative standing). 
87 Coordes, supra note 72, at 407-08. For commentary on whether lender selections more 
generally can be assumed to be efficient, see Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Efficiency Fallacy, 
2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 759 (2013) (analyzing how market mechanisms do not necessarily produce 
efficient outcomes, to the detriment of creditors, equity holders, and the public). 
88 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (holding that even if the defendant’s subsidiary 
was considered at home in California, it would not be sufficient to find the parent corporation at home there). 
89 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 
(2017). Personal jurisdiction decisions involving state court actions prompt Fourteenth Amendment 
concerns not present in bankruptcy, although Jackie Gardina has argued that the parallel Fifth 
Amendment analysis should increase in rigor. See Jackie Gardina, The Bankruptcy of Due Process: 
Nationwide Service of Process, Personal Jurisdiction and the Bankruptcy Code, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 37, 39 (2008) (“The Supreme Court has yet to define the parameters of the Fifth Amendment 
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on their own places of incorporation; the key question is where the defendant 
resides.90 In multidistrict litigation, life-tenured judges, not private parties, 
decide whether and in what district to consolidate a matter.91 These 
comparisons further call into question whether the current corporate 
bankruptcy system is sufficiently attentive to public values underlying federal 
courts and procedure jurisprudence.   
2. Access to Appellate Review: Equitable Mootness and More 
Limiting appellate review of bankruptcy court decisions further reduces 
public oversight in Chapter 11 and intensifies the authority of bankruptcy 
courts.92 Bankruptcy court decisions are more insulated than district court 
decisions from circuit-level appellate review because, in most instances, they 
must be appealed first to a district court or Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.93 
The Bankruptcy Code expressly limits the ability to unwind DIP loans and 
sales, which reduces objectors’ incentives to appeal related court orders.94 The 
 
due process clause or sanction the current analysis adopted by the federal courts. Its silence is 
deafening in circumstances in which Congress has allowed for nationwide service of process.”). 
90 See TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1514 (2017) 
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) for patent cases); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)–(b) (2012). As reflected in TC 
Heartland, corporations have been known to resist being sued in their place of incorporation. See also 
Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 783 (1997) (“[N]o plaintiff anywhere else in 
the system may commence a lawsuit based on its own place of incorporation.”). A plaintiff was formerly 
permitted to choose a venue in diversity jurisdiction cases based on the plaintiff ’s residence, but 
Congress eliminated that option in 1990. Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 § 311, 28 U.S.C. 1391 (2012). 
91 Although they are assigned for pretrial purposes only, that assignment almost always is 
dispositive. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the 
Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2017); Margaret S. Williams & Tracey 
E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict 
Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 424, 426 (2013) (“nearly all cases are resolved in the transferee 
court”). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has assigned at least one multidistrict litigation to 
sixty-three of the ninety-four federal judicial districts in the country. Id. at 443. 
92 See Roe & Tung, supra note 6, at 1276-77 (“Because of the dearth of bankruptcy appeals, 
bankruptcy judges enjoy autonomy in administering their cases.”). As discussed elsewhere, 
delegations in consumer bankruptcy cases also have escaped notice of appellate courts. Jacoby, supra 
note 6, at 887-88 (noting, based on courtroom observations, that trustees, rather than judges, 
functionally preside over Chapter 13 confirmation hearings in some districts). Superdelegation 
emphasized the cross-government-branch nature of this activity, but the application of the (relatively 
dormant) nondelegation doctrine to bankruptcy is also worth considering. See Freeman, supra note 
13, at 840 (“Despite the . . . fact that numerous delegations to private bodies have quietly survived 
judicial scrutiny, private delegations are still likely to be more troubling to courts than even broad 
delegations to public agencies.”). 
93 Bussel & Klee, supra note 82, at 684. 
94 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(m), 364(e) (2012) (noting circumstances under which a reversal or 
modification on appeal will not alter the bankruptcy court’s order, allowing the sale or loan to stand). 
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definition of a final order, a predicate to be appealable as of right, also limits 
appellate review,95 as does appellate standing doctrine.96 
Pragmatic considerations further reduce the odds appellate courts will 
scrutinize activity in a bankruptcy case. To the extent that judges encourage 
settlement and discourage parties from litigating a decision on the merits, 
neither the merits nor a court’s efforts in encouraging settlement end up being 
subject to appellate review.97 And the ability to pursue multiple layers of 
appeal is likely constrained when one of the parties is bankrupt. 
Appellate courts have added the doctrine of equitable mootness to this 
already-daunting list. The doctrine, which has captured majorities in all 
circuit courts that have considered it, allows an appellate court to dismiss an 
appeal without considering the merits.98 The court instead asks whether a 
confirmed Chapter 11 plan has been substantially consummated. 99 
Consummation is likely when an objecting creditor has not obtained a stay 
pending appeal—either because no stay was requested or the creditor cannot 
afford the bond. If the plan has been consummated, the equitable mootness 
analysis continues by considering whether granting the requested relief “will 
(a) fatally scramble the plan and/or (b) significantly harm third parties who 
have justifiably relied on plan confirmation.”100 The larger and more 
complicated the case, the more likely the appeal will be equitably moot.101 
Notwithstanding the formidable talents of the judges who preside in 
America’s bankruptcy courts, equitable mootness doctrine fosters an environment 
in which alterations of the public–private partnership can flourish with fewer 
public institutional checks. Debtors and associated parties are incentivized to 
rush to consummate a restructuring plan to insulate the deal from further judicial 
scrutiny. Because the doctrine reduces the leverage of parties financially unable 
 
95 See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135 S. Ct. 1686, 1692 (2015) (holding that an order denying 
confirmation of a proposed Chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final appealable order); Bank of New 
York Mellon v. Watt, 867 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (ruling that the court lacked appellate 
jurisdiction to review a district court’s order vacating a bankruptcy court order confirming a Chapter 
13 plan because it was not a final appealable order). 
96 See In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that 
“[a]ppellate standing in the bankruptcy context is more restrictive than Article III standing” and 
citing other circuit cases similarly limiting appellate standing). 
97 See, e.g., Porter v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 981 F. Supp. 1129, 1131-32 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (rejecting a 
party’s claim of being rushed and coerced into accepting settlement agreement). But see In re A.T. Reynolds 
& Sons, Inc., 452 B.R. 374, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reversing sanction awarded by a bankruptcy court after 
finding a party failed to participate in good faith, noting that “inquiry into the parties’ conduct in a 
mediation, backed by the threat of sanctions, may exact a coercive influence on the parties to settle”). 
98 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 838 F.3d 792, 807 (6th Cir. 2016) (Moore, J., Dissenting) 
(observing that the doctrine has been adopted by every circuit to consider it). 
99 See, e.g., In re Tribune Media Co., 799 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2015), cert denied sub nom. 
Aurelius Capital Mgmt. v. Tribune Media Co., 136 S. Ct. 1459 (2016). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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to post the bond required to obtain a stay pending appeal, the balance among 
various private parties is further skewed as well. 
Equitable mootness doctrine affects the maintenance of underlying public 
values in other ways. The doctrine is in tension with Supreme Court case law 
directing judges to hear and decide cases and controversies within their 
subject-matter jurisdiction.102 The prospect of appellate review by a multi-
judge court fosters confidence in the system.103 Indeed, “the value of the 
appellate system’s ability to increase public trust in judicial outcomes may 
exceed the amount of error correction actually accomplished.”104 Judith 
Resnik has emphasized the importance of public participation (including 
observation) in adjudicatory processes as a democratic practice.105 As a result 
of equitable mootness, even fewer people get to tell their stories to a court of 
higher authority, or to observe an appellate court considering the matter. 
C. Disabling a Disciplining Backstop 
Like removing the batteries from a kitchen smoke alarm while preparing 
a special dish, a risky act often starts with good intentions and the belief that 
the risks are both minimal and manageable. But habituation to disabling the 
alarm can lead to disaster—inability to cope with crisis when the need arises. 
In Chapter 11, the threat of trustee appointment has similarly been disabled 
in larger corporate cases.106 
Repeat players in the bankruptcy system have developed a sense that 
trustee appointment is intolerable.107 Professionals doubt the qualifications of 
 
102 See Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) 
(noting the “virtually unflagging” obligation of a federal court to hear and decide cases within its 
jurisdiction); Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588-91 (2013) (noting that “federal courts 
are obliged to decide cases within the scope of federal jurisdiction” and “have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given”) (citation omitted); see also 
Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 
387-88 (2017) (discussing critiques of equitable mootness as extended to municipal bankruptcy). 
103 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1239, 1263 (2013). 
104 Id. at 1272. 
105 Resnik, supra note 49, at 16-17 (“States need their members and residents to participate in 
adjudicatory processes, both to maintain peace and security as well as to generate and to reinforce 
their own authority to do so.”). 
106 See Dickerson, supra note 63, at 875-76 (tracing the substitution of creditor-selected 
managers for trustees and arguing that the former should have the same duties as the latter). 
107 See Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 469, 520 (2011) (arguing that expanded trustee appointment “would meet 
intense resistance”); Dickerson, supra note 63, at 902 (discussing secured creditors’ resistance to 
trustee appointment). As LoPucki has highlighted, if a trustee could not get appointed in a case 
with as much fraud as Enron, would there ever be a suitably egregious circumstance to warrant 
appointment? See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 148 (2005). For a parallel analysis 
regarding Chapter 11 examiners, see Lipson, supra note 3. 
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trustee candidates and seem to believe that the statutory alternative of 
electing a Chapter 11 trustee is infeasible.108 They have taken insufficient heed 
of the analysis of Kelli Alces, who has contended that courts have considerable 
discretion to tailor the scope of a trustee’s duties, suggesting that trustee 
displacement need not be as drastic a remedy as is sometimes suggested.109 
The restructuring world has coalesced around a private workaround, such 
as the chief restructuring officer (CRO)—discussed in scholarship by both 
Mechele Dickerson and Michelle Harner110—that operates almost entirely 
outside the governance architecture in the Bankruptcy Code and Judicial 
Code. CROs are selected by someone other than the administrative 
watchdog, appointed under different (and contested) statutory authority, and 
may not even be subject to court oversight of their compensation.111 
In addition to resisting trustee appointment in Chapter 11, restructuring 
professionals and repeat player lenders may limit the odds of trustee 
appointment in other ways, and for other reasons. Businesses destined for 
sale nonetheless tend to file Chapter 11, the “reorganization” chapter, rather 
than Chapter 7 petitions. The standards for conversion to Chapter 7 from 
Chapter 11 are lighter, or at least more varied, than Chapter 11 trustee 
appointment.112 Yet, at least for larger cases, the threat of conversion to 
Chapter 7 also seems to have collapsed, at least until all actions of 
consequence have been taken. Professionals have a financial stake in this fight. 
Upon conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, professionals’ Chapter 11 fees 
are subordinated to Chapter 7 trustee fees.113 It is hardly irrational for 
professionals to be concerned about getting paid. But the question here is the 
impact of these private party preferences on the overall public–private 
balance and the system’s integrity. 
By incrementally but systematically weakening the trustee backstop, private 
parties have shifted the balance of power. Potent tools and powers have been 
substituted with private-party-supplied alternatives that are qualitatively different. 
 
108 See supra note 107. 
109 Kelli A. Alces, Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy, 56 KAN. L. REV. 83, 106-
107 (2007) (giving examples of limited trustee appointments that did not require complete 
elimination of management and explaining legal basis for these acts); see also AM. BANKR. INST., 
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 31 (2014) (supporting the idea that a Chapter 11 trustee should be able to 
retain managers and employees deemed necessary to the reorganization process). 
110 Dickerson, supra note 63, at 917 (describing the “new private trustee”); id. at 921 
(documenting the frequency of chief restructuring officers in large cases); Harner, supra note 107. 
111 Dickerson, supra note 63, at 918, 921. 
112 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2012) (delineating circumstances under which a Chapter 11 should be 
converted to Chapter 7). 
113 Id. § 726(b) (giving administrative priority claims incurred in Chapter 7 priority over 
administrative claims incurred in Chapter 11 before conversion). 
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D. Shifting Litigation Responsibility 
Bankruptcy empowers a trustee to scrutinize and seek to unwind certain 
pre-bankruptcy transactions.114 Absent trustee appointment, this scavenger 
hunt obligation rests with the debtor-in-possession. Debtors-in-possession in 
larger Chapter 11 cases have transferred these responsibilities in yet another 
off-script alternative: statutory committees of creditors.115 
In some cases, this delegation might seem logical. A committee of sexual 
abuse claimants, for example, might be well situated to pursue litigation against 
a bankrupt diocese.116 Yet, given that committees are creatures of the Bankruptcy 
Code,117 it is notable that the Bankruptcy Code itself does not assign avoidance 
actions to committees directly.118 Committee members’ interests may not overlap 
well enough with those of the bankruptcy estate as a whole.119 
Committee composition is bound to affect the extent to which avoidance 
actions are pursued, abandoned, or settled in ways that may be consistent with 
obligations to unsecured creditors but depart from what a true estate fiduciary 
would have done. For example, committees have advocated in some cases for full 
 
114 Leveraged buyout transactions are a frequent target. Danielle D’Onfro, Limited Liability 
Property, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1365 (2018) (discussing doctrines to prevent dissipation of assets to 
creditors’ detriment); Marie T. Reilly, The Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. 
REV. 1213, 1248-51 (1997) (discussing application to leveraged buyouts). 
115 See Bussel & Klee, supra note 82, at 690 (“Indeed, it has increasingly become the practice 
for courts simply to authorize the committee to prosecute or settle much estate litigation, 
particularly avoiding power litigation and claims against insiders.”); id. at 736 (“The Bankruptcy 
Code, however, does not expressly contemplate the current practice of looking to the committee to 
give de facto binding consent to preplan case-dispositive settlements, financings and sales.”); see also 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir. 
2003) (en banc) (holding that bankruptcy courts have sufficient authority to authorize derivative 
standing); In re Commodore Int’l Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing circumstances 
where a creditors’ committee can acquire standing to pursue claims of the bankruptcy estate). Even 
before the Third Circuit authorized the practice, derivative standing was used frequently. In re W.R. 
Grace Co., 285 B.R. 148, 155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (discussing cases treating derivative standing as 
a settled issue). Bankruptcy professionals were likely influential in the Cybergenics en banc reversal. 
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 221, 238-40 (2004). For a court less accepting of derivative standing, see, e.g., In re Fox, 
305 B.R. 912, 915-16 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004)(upholding bankruptcy judge ruling that only a trustee 
or DIP can pursue avoidance actions). 
116 Thanks to Pamela Foohey for highlighting this example. 
117 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (outlining the appointment of a creditors’ committee). 
118 See id. § 1103 (discussing the powers and duties of committees). 
119 See In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1315 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]he committee is a 
fiduciary for those whom it represents, not for the debtor or the estate generally.”). 
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payment of priority claims,120 but supported skipping priority claims in others.121 
Some committee members may be eager to prevent certain avoidance actions 
from being litigated rather than zealously pursuing them.122 For all of its 
supposed benefits, granting derivative standing to committees gives them extra 
leverage to compromise the rights of some creditors while advantaging others.123 
Recognizing the potential divergence of interests between committees and the 
bankruptcy estate, appellate case law calls for bankruptcy courts to fill the gap through 
monitoring.124 Judges may not have the information and infrastructure to fulfill this 
responsibility under even the best of circumstances. But the aforementioned 
concentration of large cases, producing the need for the triage discussed above, makes 
court oversight of this redelegation of litigation authority even more unrealistic. 
Furthermore, the routine allocation of avoidance actions to committees may be 
accompanied by a broader sense of freedom of the debtor-in-possession, on the theory 
that the committee is now the stand-in for the estate. Offloading estate responsibility 
while benefitting from debtor-in-possession status, largely free of fear of trustee 
appointment, again distorts the system’s balance. 
 
120 See e.g., Transcript at 4, In re Allen Family Foods, No. 11-11764 (Bankr. D. Del. June 24, 
2011). Four supplier members of the Allen Family Foods creditors’ committee asserted supplier 
priority claims: Archer Daniel Midland, Interstate Corpack, Tri-Gas & Oil, and Wye Mills Grain. 
Claims Register, In re Allen Family Foods, Inc., 11-11764 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 
1025; Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re Allen Family Foods, Inc., 
11-11764 (Bankr. D. Del. June 17, 2011), ECF No. 53. The committee in Sports Authority’s Chapter 
11 advocated for suppliers asserting priority claims, which ultimately accepted less than full payment. 
Several members of the Sports Authority creditors’ committee (Nike, Realty Income Corp., and 
GGP) asserted priority claims. Notice of Appointment of Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re 
TSAWD Holdings, 16-10527 (Bankr. D. Del., Mar. 10, 2016), ECF No. 262; Claims Register, In re 
TSAWD Holdings, Inc., 16-10527 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 2, 2016), ECF No. 3549. For earlier iterations 
of this issue, see Stephen J. Lubben, The “New and Improved” Chapter 11, 93 KY. L.J. 839, 854 (2004). 
121 See, e.g., Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. 137 S. Ct. 973 (2017) (holding that a structured 
dismissal order that skips a priority claimant in allocating funds is not permitted under the 
Bankruptcy Code, but does not necessarily foreclose other priority-skipping practices). Sally Henry 
has uncovered a variety of creative ways in which parties try to skip priority; committees are involved 
in many examples. See Sally McDonald Henry, Chapter 11 Zombies, 50 IND. L. REV. 579 (2017). 
122 Sometimes such avoidance actions can be buried through asset sales with the understanding 
that the buyer will not pursue those suits. Transcript of Hearing, In re Allen Family Foods, Inc., No. 
11-11764, (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2011) (ECF No. 88). 
123 See Diane Lourdes Dick, Valuation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: The Dangers of an Implicit Market Test, 2017 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1487, 1498 (discussing impact of relying on committees to conduct investigations in other contexts). 
124 In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 544 F.3d 420, 423-25 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the court’s 
withdrawal of derivative standing and transfer of management of litigation was not abuse of discretion); 
id. at 424 (“[A] court’s role [is to] . . . oversee the litigation and ‘to check any potential for abuse by the 
parties’.”); In re Commodore Int’l Ltd., 262 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding withdrawal of 
derivative standing and discussing the court’s role in balancing and oversight). 
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III. THREE STEPS TOWARD RESTORING HYBRIDITY 
So far, this Article has done the following. Part I established the grounds for 
conceptualizing corporate bankruptcy as a public–private partnership and 
documented the hybridity of bankruptcy that makes this model a good descriptive 
and normative fit. Part II identified aspects of corporate bankruptcy practice that 
distort the partnership. Part III will float three ideas to both promote and take 
advantage of the partnership model in the real world and the legal academy. 
A. Procedural Justice 
Debates about corporate bankruptcy tend to coalesce around outcomes. 
How much money did creditors receive? How many companies 
reorganized?125 Yet, parties and the public evaluate systems on criteria other 
than (financial) end results.126 The bankruptcy system’s very premises—not 
enough to go around, changing legal entitlements without consent—make its 
procedures particularly vulnerable to public distrust. 
Even if increasing the influence of private parties in Chapter 11 
guaranteed efficiency (far from a foregone conclusion),127 public–private 
partnerships can ill afford to use efficiency as the exclusive metric.128 
Increasing efficiency would not inevitably serve the system if the efficiency-
promoting steps led the public to question the system’s legitimacy.129 
Procedural justice theory is relevant to maintaining the legitimacy of legal 
systems and individuals’ compliance with them. Theoretical and empirical research 
since at least the 1970s has examined how individuals perceive the fairness of 
 
125 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to Its Critics, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 611 (2009) (“[P]lan confirmation is surely the central measure of success in 
Chapter 11. A system that does not lead to confirmed plans cannot achieve its objectives.”). 
126 Gross, supra note 28, at 1033 (recognizing the importance of community interests in the 
bankruptcy process); Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice between Cash and the Courthouse: 
Experiences with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 L. & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008) (emphasizing 
interest in values other than financial compensation, such as information forcing and attainment of 
justice); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not about the Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 
68 U. PITT. L. REV. 341, 342, 373 (2006) (discussing plaintiffs’ non-monetary motivations). 
127 See Dick, supra note 123, at 1491 (describing the dangers of relying on private negotiations to 
produce accurate valuations, given that some relevant parties may be excluded from the negotiation 
process); Roe & Tung, supra note 6, at 1244, 1271 (2013); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 27, at 1253 
(observing that the assumption that upping reliance on private parties to increase efficiency “ignores 
basic economic theory, including the problems of pricing inefficiencies and high transaction costs”). 
128 See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC 122 (2017) (describing how privatization promoters “assume without explaining why 
economic efficiency is an unalloyed good or why it translates well into the public arena. Specifically, they fail 
to reconcile this celebration of efficiency with an underlying constitutional culture that is decidedly skeptical 
of efficiency arguments”). Michaels observes that separation of powers is intentionally inefficient. Id. 
129 See Lemos, supra note 13, at 520 (noting concerns about private financing of public action raised 
in circumstances “marked by substantial externalities and where distributive concerns are strongest”). 
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systems of authority, distinct from the outcome.130 Although the reasons remain 
contested, “[r]obust findings suggest that individuals value decisionmaking 
processes that they deem fair, are more willing to accept and adhere to decisions 
made via fair processes, and believe that authorities are more legitimate when they 
have used fair processes.”131 Procedures, rather than outcomes, may be the largest 
contributors to public dissatisfaction with the legal system.132 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff summarizes the studies this way: 
Simply put, the empirical evidence suggests that individuals value fairness of 
process, separate and apart from outcome, because of the special message that 
fairness of process sends to its recipients: an authority who acts in a fair 
manner is an authority who is legitimate and cares about the dignity and 
social standing of those who stand before it.133 
Consistent among demographic and economic backgrounds, the fairness of 
process has been the primary factor shaping willingness to accept decisions—both 
for parties in interest and the public.134. Evaluation of perceptions is generally ex 
post rather than ex ante.135 Key elements shaping perceptions of procedural justice 
include neutrality of the decisionmaker (aided by transparency), respect afforded 
to the party, and trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, with voice (the opportunity 
to tell one’s side of the story in one’s own words) being an indirect contributor.136 
The bankruptcy system has not undergone rigorous procedural justice 
assessment.137 Nonetheless, Elizabeth Gibson’s work suggests that experiences 
 
130 For the history, see Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 381, 
384 n.7 (2010). John Thiebaut and Laurens Walker are credited with the early model propelling this 
research based on social exchange theory. See generally Tom Tyler, Peter Degoey & Heather Smith, 
Understanding Why the Justice of Group Procedures Matters: A Test of the Psychological Dynamics of the 
Group-Value Model, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 913, 913 (1996) (testing “whether fair 
procedures, in fact, communicate . . . identity-relevant information and whether it is this 
information that mediates the influence of procedural justice on general group-oriented behaviors”). 
131 Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 130, at 388. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 10, at 129 (“[W]hen 
people feel that they have been treated fairly by decisionmaking authorities, they are more likely to accept 
and comply with decisions, feel satisfied with outcomes, and believe in the legitimacy of the authority.”). 
132 See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Calibrating Participation: Reflections on Procedure Versus 
Procedural Justice, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 323, 323 (2016) (citing empirical literature regarding unfair procedures 
as “the single most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system”). 
133 Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 10, at 137-38. 
134 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 28-29 (2007); see also 
Burch, supra note 132, at 330 (noting forum shopping as example in which “procedures can drift away 
from their procedural justice moorings”). 
135 Burch, supra note 10, at 27 (“Empirical research has demonstrated that the two vantage 
points are distinct: ex ante evaluations do not necessarily predict ex post satisfaction.”). 
136 See id. at 28; Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 130, at 390-91; Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 
10, at 135; Tyler, supra note 134, at 30-31. 
137 Efforts to uncover prior applications to bankruptcy have produced only one source. See The 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 2533 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 57-58 (2011) (statement of Melissa 
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with other forms of aggregate litigation are relevant to bankruptcy.138 
Procedural justice is critical to legitimacy maintenance in aggregate 
litigation.139 Resnik, Curtis, and Hensler have observed that welfarist 
evaluations of aggregate litigation’s cost, accuracy and utility of outcomes are 
incomplete without inclusion of procedural justice concerns.140 Aggregate 
litigation’s procedural justice weak spots include reduced attention to 
individuals, privatized governance, and increased amounts of non-public 
activity.141 These are important lessons for corporate bankruptcy. 
Public actors can more readily implement the lessons of procedural justice 
than assess welfare implications on the spot. Thus, systematically attending to 
procedural justice is itself a way to promote public values.142 Currently, federal 
courts are far from uniform on logistical matters that affect public access, including 
 
B. Jacoby, Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC). Of course, others have made 
similar points without using the term procedural justice. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, University of 
Texas School of Law, Testimony to the American Bankruptcy Institute Commission on Chapter 11 Reform: 
Venue: Domestic and International at 3 (Nov. 22, 2013) (“[T]he removal of proceedings to a distant place 
seems to defy common sense and may leave local citizens suspicious of the motives behind it.”). 
138 See S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, CASE STUDIES OF MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS 
ACTION SETTLEMENTS AND BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATIONS (2000) (“An examination of . . . 
class action settlements as a group in contrast to . . . bankruptcy reorganizations . . . allows some 
comparisons about the fairness and effectiveness of these two means of achieving global resolutions 
of mass tort liabilities.”); S. Elizabeth Gibson, A Response to Professor Resnick: Will This Vehicle Pass 
Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2095, 2107 (2000) (“Stating the differences in the requirements 
[between class actions and bankruptcy] . . . merely begs the question why typicality, adequacy of 
representation, and predominance are concerns of class actions and not also of bankruptcy.”). See 
generally Troy A. McKenzie, The Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Pre-History, 5 J. TORT LAW 59 
(2012)(deeming the relationship between bankruptcy and aggregate litigation as one of 
transformation); Troy McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Aggregate Litigation, 87 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (2012) (noting that bankruptcy provides a useful lens for aggregation). 
139 See Burch, supra note 132, at 326 (focusing on “securing and curtailing participation rights through 
both aggregating and pleading”); Burch, supra note 10, at 5 (noting “procedural justice’s significance by 
observing its symbiotic relationship with institutional legitimacy and voluntary compliance”); Resnik, Curtis, 
& Hensler, supra note 10, at 307 (noting the dearth of scholarship on issues such as “aggregation, the financing 
of litigation, the role of lawyers, or how to shape aggregate cases to enable any of that to which they aspire—
voice, participation, rights seeking, empowerment—to occur”). 
140 Resnik, Curtis & Hensler, supra note 10, at 307, 372, 376. 
141 See Burch, supra note 10, at 10-11. 
142 In the General Motors bankruptcy, several years after the company was sold and litigation 
continued on various matters, the presiding judge permitted retirees, located around the country, to tell their 
stories by telephone in open court. Melissa B. Jacoby, Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Notes 
on Visit to S.D.N.Y. (June 14, 2012) (on file with author). By contrast, at least two books on the A.H. Robins 
bankruptcy indicate that the presiding district judge was dismissive of concerns that women who were 
adversely affected by the company’s birth control product lacked access to the courtroom and to information. 
See KAREN M. HICKS, SURVIVING THE DALKON SHIELD IUD: WOMEN V. THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 51, 97, 174 (1994); RICHARD SOBEL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 180 (1991) (“Not only would Judge Mehrige not let injured women testify, he did 
not even want them in the courtroom . . . . [He] evidenced his disdain toward both the claimants and their 
lawyers: . . . ‘I will try to explain to the ladies, there isn’t any need for them to stay around, but I don’t think 
that will chase many of them away until maybe the first recess, and then [they’ll] get tired.’”). 
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even availability of daily hearing calendars,143 and posting digital recordings of 
hearings on court dockets.144 The necessary approvals for the latter within the 
federal judiciary are in place.145 Bankruptcy courts on the whole probably use this 
technology more than other federal trial courts but still vary greatly.146 
The public–private partnership model suggests an important expansion 
to the circle of parties responsible for procedural justice. References to 
evaluation of the “decisionmaker” in the procedural justice literature should 
apply to the administrative watchdog as well as judges. More significantly, in 
a hybrid system, it would be wrong to assign all procedural justice 
responsibility to public officials. For both theoretical and instrumental 
reasons, private parties (including lenders, debtors-in-possession, and 
creditors’ committees) also are responsible for the construction of a fair 
process and should be assessed accordingly. 
B. The Sunlight Fund 
Recognizing corporate bankruptcy’s hybridity with the public–private 
partnership label is not merely a matter of semantics. It presents avenues to think 
differently about the process of reform as well as its objectives. For example, other 
 
143 See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, What’s On at a Courthouse Near You, CREDIT SLIPS (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/07/whats-playing-at-the-bankruptcy-court-near-you-bank
ruptcy-court-calls-revisited.html [https://perma.cc/56TK-UZFF] (describing the “variation in the 
website availability of daily calendars for U.S. bankruptcy courtrooms”). 
144 See Jacoby, supra note 6, at 883-84 (describing the use of audio recordings to conduct 
research on the City of Detroit bankruptcy). 
145 In 1999, the Judicial Conference of the United States approved digital audio recording as a method 
of taking the official court record. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (2005). In 2007, the Judicial Conference authorized a 
pilot project in the district and bankruptcy courts to make digital recordings of hearings available on PACER. 
JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 12 (2007). That pilot was extended and expanded in 2009. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2009) 
(noting that the pilot program was extended by one year, “so that data from up to five additional courts” could 
be included). In 2010, the Judicial Conference endorsed a proposal to allow courts to provide access to digital 
audio through PACER at the discretion of the presiding judge. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 9-10 (2010). 
146 Looking at a one-year period, I identified three dozen bankruptcy courts that posted digital 
audio recordings on PACER at least once. Based on that search, some bankruptcy courts seem to be 
regular users of the technology, such as the District of Puerto Rico, the Eastern and Middle Districts of 
North Carolina, and the Eastern District of Michigan, while others used it rarely. Magnet districts for 
large Chapter 11 cases were not among the users, although the District of Delaware has recently amended 
its policy. See News & Announcements: Digital Audio Files Available over the Internet Beginning November 6, 
2017, U.S. BANKR. CT., D. DEL. (Oct. 31, 2017), http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/
DEB_CourtSpeak_Notification_10-31-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWA7-CMMV]. A broader search 
produced a small number of audio recordings in the Southern District of New York bankruptcy court 
in 2011–2012 for General Motors and in 2009 for Chrysler. 
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public–private partnerships involve a range of institutions, such as nonprofit 
special purpose corporations, which assist in furthering public goals.147 
So let us consider the Sunlight Fund as a way to advance the goals of corporate 
bankruptcy by providing an alternative and competing source of capital for 
businesses in bankruptcy. The types of actions eligible for the Sunlight Fund 
should be up for debate,148 but overall the goal would be designed to reduce the 
ability of private parties with leverage to deter estate-enhancing and public-value–
promoting activity. For example, it could reduce the leverage of pre-petition 
lenders to condition DIP lending on refraining from estate- and transparency- 
promoting activities, including certain causes of action. Or it could be used to fund 
a bond that must be posted to obtain a stay of an order pending appeal when that 
bond otherwise would be out of financial reach for the objector. 
As this cursory description suggests, the details and competing considerations 
have yet to be worked out. Most prominent is how to capitalize the Sunlight Fund 
itself. One possible, albeit limited, source is bankruptcy filing-fee revenue currently 
being diverted to other parts of the federal government. It also will be necessary to 
think through what controls should be imposed on tapping this fund, such as 
requiring that the litigation at least survive a motion to dismiss. 
The general takeaway for now is this: conceptualizing bankruptcy as a 
public–private partnership allows proposals of this nature to flow more 
readily, providing a richer set of materials and perspectives for the bankruptcy 
world to consider. 
C. Rewriting the Invitation List 
If the next major symposium on corporate bankruptcy law focuses on the 
Sunlight Fund, or on procedural justice, who will be invited to present papers 
and discuss ideas? The introduction to this Article posited that the field of 
corporate bankruptcy has been redistricted to a narrow range of issues and 
methods. Much of this Article has sought to expand the questions and 
methods used to evaluate and improve corporate bankruptcy. 
Left to be addressed is the homogeneity of those often asked to chart 
bankruptcy’s next frontiers. Will a new model of corporate bankruptcy also 
beget demographic diversification? To achieve the objectives discussed in this 
Article, both ideological and demographic expansions are necessary. 
 
147 Some cities have established nonprofit organizations to accept donations to fund public 
interest litigation. See Lemos, supra note 13, at 534. 
148 For example, Lipson has proposed mini-examinations consistent with experimentalist 
regulatory theory. Lipson, supra note 3, at 252. 
1744 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1715 
Research supports the commonsense inference that a diverse team 
produces better results.149 “Groups of cognitively diverse people can make 
more accurate predictions, solve problems, improve performance, and 
aggregate information.”150 Homogeneity breeds cognitive bias: cascade and 
conformity effects, confirmation bias, and group polarization.151 Diverse 
groups not only might create better products but also have an easier time 
convincing others to accept them.152 The population affected by bankruptcy 
cases is heterogeneous by many measures, increasing the relevance of 
diversity as a legitimacy-promoting tool.153 
In the legal academy, white men, particularly those associated with traditional 
law and economics, tend to dominate high-profile publications and events about 
 
149 See Amanda Bayer & Cecelia Elena Rouse, Diversity in the Economics Profession: A New 
Attack on an Old Problem, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 232-33 (2016) (noting that the “range of views among 
economists is likely to be biased by the relative lack of women and minority economists” and “racially 
diverse groups significantly outperform other groups in solving complex problems”); Debbie 
Chachra, To Reduce Gender Biases, Acknowledge Them, 548 NATURE 373, 373 (“[D]iverse teams of 
engineers do better engineering . . . . [I]f you value rationality and objectivity, you need to engage 
with gender bias.”); Diane Coyle, Economics Has a Problem With Women, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6b3cc8be-881e-11e7-afd2-74b8ecd34d3b [https://perma.cc/GW29-
DQLU] (“It is just as bad to have mainly male economic research and policy advice as it is to test 
medicines mainly on men.”); Inefficient Equilibrium: Women and Economics, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 
19, 2017), https://www.economist.com/christmas-specials/2017/12/19/women-and-economics 
[https://perma.cc/3LDK-S2V8] [hereinafter Inefficient Equilibrium] (“There is every chance that this 
lack of diversity [in economics] constrains or distorts the field’s intellectual development.”). 
150 Burch, supra note 132, at 349. See also Martha T. McCluskey, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Taub, 
Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300 (2016) (“[W]e need more, 
not fewer, accounts of how law can improve economic justice and economic policy.”). 
151 See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1008, 1014, 1051-52, 1055 (2016) 
(“[S]ocial science teaches that such a homogeneous group of individuals is predisposed to act in a biased fashion.”). 
152 An American Bar Association resolution tied the demographic make-up of the bankruptcy 
bench to public confidence in the judiciary. Resolution 102, AM. BAR ASS’N 4-6 (Aug. 8-9, 2016) 
(“Diversity on the bankruptcy bench is particularly important in relation to perceptions of justice.”). 
A New York State Bar Association task force report notes the “well-documented benefits of diversity 
in decision-making processes for all stakeholders,” and that when “members of group notice they are 
socially different from one another, . . . they assume they will need to work harder to come to a 
consensus,” which can produce better outcomes. N. Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, IF NOT NOW, WHEN? 
ACHIEVING EQUALITY FOR WOMEN ATTORNEYS IN THE COURTROOM AND ADR (2017). In the 
courtroom, “a team with diverse voices may be more capable of communicating in terms that 
resonate with a broader spectrum of courtroom decision-makers.” Id. at 29. See also STEPHANIE A. 
SCHARF & ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG, FIRST CHAIRS AT TRIAL: MORE WOMEN NEED SEATS 
AT THE TABLE 3 (2015) (noting that a lack of women in lead roles results in “less diversity of 
thinking, less effectiveness in front of a broad range of judges and jurors, and less creative energy 
brought to bear on client matters”). 
153 See e.g., Tyler, supra note 134, at 28-30 (2007) (discussing diversity of ethnic and social 
backgrounds amongst those who bring problems to court). 
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corporate bankruptcy.154 Examples include Bankruptcy Law Stories,155 a forthcoming 
corporate bankruptcy handbook,156 a 2014 conference on creditors in corporate 
governance at the University of Chicago,157 a 2017 conference at the University of 
Pennsylvania,158 and a 2017 joint NYU/Penn law and finance conference.159 
Events organized by scholars or organizations with other orientations have not 
escaped homogeneity. Examples include a conference on Chapter 11 reform and 
secured credit sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute and the Illinois 
Law Review,160 the Rethinking Chapter 11 conference held on Capitol Hill by the 
National Bankruptcy Conference in 2015,161 and panels on corporate bankruptcy 
and financial institutions during a conference at the University of Texas in 2018.162 
Dozens of female scholars have written on business bankruptcy topics.163 
Judging by research in other fields, however, they probably are cited less than 
 
154 For evidence of bias, whether implicit or otherwise, in the academic field of economics, see 
generally Bayer & Rouse, supra note 149; Coyle, supra note 149; Inefficient Equilibrium, supra note 
149; Amanda Bayer & David Wilcox, The Unequal Distribution of Economic Education, (Fin. & Econ. 
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-105); Erin Hengel, Publishing While Female: Are Women 
Held to Higher Standards? Evidence from Peer Review.( Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available 
at http://www.erinhengel.com/research/publishing_female.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2PE-DWK3]; 
Alice H. Wu, Gender Stereotyping in Academia: Evidence from Economics Job Market Rumors Forum 
(Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3051462 [http://perma.cc/9Ql7-8VZY]. 
155 BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES, (Robert K. Rasmussen ed., 2007) (featuring nine male-
authored chapters and one female-authored chapter). 
156 Sixteen authors are male, two authors are female, and all but about five of the authors 
(including one of the women) do work falling within law and economics. 
157 Creditors and Corporate Governance, BECKER FRIEDMAN INST., https://bfi.uchicago.edu/
events/creditors-and-corporate-governance-0 [https://perma.cc/F69L-PFY5] (featuring eleven 
male academic presenters and one female academic presenter). 
158 Symposium Schedule: Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, U. PA. L. REV., https://www.penn
lawreview.com/symposium/schedule/ [https://perma.cc/8UQF-PD79] (featuring discussion of seven 
papers in total: one authored by a white woman and six coauthored by eleven white men, nearly all 
law-and-economics scholars, nine of whom have coauthored with each other in various combinations 
over the years). See Symposium, Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1571 (2018). 
159 The Thirteenth Annual NYU/Penn Conference on Law and Finance, N.Y.U. L., http://www.law.
nyu.edu/node/29462 [https://perma.cc/6C8G-NG2A] (including presentations only by men). 
160 Three of nineteen paper presenters at the live event were women. Published papers (with 
a slightly different mix of contributors—but still three women) are captured in Illinois ABI Symposium 
on Chapter 11 Reform, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 401, 507-863 (2015). 
161 Conference Schedule, National Bankruptcy Conference: Rethinking Chapter 11 (May 28–29, 
2015), https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/8700/original/NBC_20Rethinking_20Chapter_2011_20
Schedule_20_as_20revised_203-25-15_.pdf [https://perma.cc/KYU8-SFZ7] (among twenty-five speakers, 
three were academics, and all three were white men associated with law and economics). 
162 Symposium: Bankruptcy’s Universal Pragmatist: Celebrating the Work of Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
TEX. L. REV., https://texaslawreview.org/symposium/ [https://perma.cc/5YEJ-5C3R] (including 
one woman on the corporate bankruptcy panel out of five panelists, plus a male panel chair, and one 
woman on a financial institutions restructuring panel out of six panelists, plus a male panel chair). 
The honoree of this symposium played no role in selecting the participants. 
163 The sources cited throughout this Article do not exhaust the list. 
1746 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1715 
men even after controlling for important variables.164 It is not a neutral 
practice to cite only authors and papers that first come to mind.165 It is not a 
neutral practice to express explicit disagreement with some authors and 
overlook others as unworthy of even a “but see.” 
These dynamics do not exist in a vacuum. Corporate bankruptcy law 
practice is “disproportionately male.”166 The academic field of economics has 
received significant attention for multiple signs of bias.167 
Whatever the context, whatever the cause, the odds of conceptualizing the 
field as a public–private partnership are reduced without diversifying the 
voices contributing to the debate.168 If high-profile conferences and 
publications continue defining the field in its narrower, redistricted form, 
they at least should strive for truth in advertising on the scope of the 
enterprise. Individual authors should be mindful that selecting who and what 
to cite in their scholarship shapes the field and its inclusiveness footnote by 
footnote, line by line, article by article. 
 
164 Molly M. King et al., Men Set Their Own Cites High: Gender and Self-Citation Across Fields and over 
Time, 3 SOCIUS, 2017, at 1, 2 (noting a disparity in citations between men and women across disciplines 
even after controlling for variables such as institution, journal, and tenure status). Self-citation, which 
boosts overall citation counts through several pathways, occurs at higher rates among men. Id. at 15. 
165 Emily Beaulieu et al., Women Also Know Stuff: Meta-Level Mentoring to Battle Gender Bias in 
Political Science, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 779, 780 (2017) (“[M]en and women alike hold implicit biases 
about gender that shape their attitudes and behavior, including the tendency to think of—and 
reference—men rather than women as experts.”). 
166 David A. Skeel, Jr., Rediscovering Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 1015, 
1025 (2015). In 2014, 30.6% of bankruptcy judges were women and under 3% were African American. AM. 
BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 4-5; see also Laurel M. Isicoff, Judicial Fellows Diversity Initiative: It’s Just a 
Beginning, C. COLUMNS (Am. Coll. Of Bankr., Stanardsville, Va.), May 2017, at 10-11 (sharing that ABA 
reported two years earlier that “the bankruptcy bench is the least diverse of the federal judiciary” and 
describing resulting initiatives). This demography is in line with that of related fields: for example, in 
the more readily measured litigation realms, white men dominate as lead counsel in corporate and 
commercial law litigation, and in so-called bet-the-company litigation and high-stakes alternative dispute 
resolution. N. Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 152, at 10 (“The more high-stakes the case, the lower the 
odds that a woman would be involved.”) (quoting Noah Hanft, Making Diversity Happen in ADR: No More 
Lip Service, 257 N.Y. L.J. S6 (2017)); see also Daniella Isaacson, Where Do We Go From Here? Big Law’s 
Struggle with Recruiting and Retaining Female Talent, LAW.COM (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:03 AM) 
https://www.law.com/sites/ali/2017/04/17/where-do-we-go-from-here-big-laws-struggle-with-recruiting-
and-retaining-female-talent/?slreturn=20180309141735 [https://perma.cc/A32M-Y8KC], (discussing low 
representation of female attorneys in corporate and banking law). Some studies find low rates of women 
as lead counsel in class actions as well. Scharf & Liebenberg, supra note 152, at 12 (reporting that in a 
study of cases filed in 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, men were lead 
counsel in eighty-seven percent class actions). 
167 See supra note 154. 
168 See generally June Carbone & Naomi Kahn, Unequal Terms: Gender, Power, and the Recreation of 
Hierarchy, 69 STUD. L., POL. & SOC’Y 189, 211 (2016) (“The elite of our new gilded age valorizes competition, 
individualism and hierarchy . . . . The hierarchies rewarding competition at the top create vicious cycles that 
block more substantive change.”). As just one example, scholars who have experienced discrimination 
throughout their own lives are less likely to see the civil rights implications of bankruptcy as an extraneous issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article had both descriptive and normative aims. Characterizing the 
existing corporate bankruptcy system as a public–private partnership facilitates the 
goals expressed by Jay Westbrook that began this Article—to bring a broader range 
of considerations to dominant scholarly discourse on corporate bankruptcy. The 
model helps diagnose problems in current practice, as well as to get new purchase 
on problems already on the radar screen. The model fosters solutions that are “out 
of the box” for corporate bankruptcy because it has been insufficiently influenced 
to date by scholars of the regulatory state. 
One need not be wedded to the problems and solutions in this Article to 
find value in the model. The ideas expressed here have only scratched the 
surface of an expanded and reconceptualized field. What the academy and the 
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